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INTRODUCTION
“You have the right to an attorney. If you cannot afford an
attorney, one will be appointed for you.”1 When we hear this phrase
*

Sarah Lustbader is a Senior Program Associate in the Center on Sentencing and
Corrections at the Vera Institute of Justice. She previously worked as a public
defender at The Bronx Defenders. Sarah holds a J.D. from N.Y.U. School of Law,
where she served on the N.Y.U. Law Review, and a B.A. from Stanford University.
1. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966); see Alex McBride, Landmark
Cases: Miranda v. Arizona (1966), PBS: THE SUPREME COURT (Dec. 2006),
https://www.pbs.org/wnet/supremecourt/rights/landmark_miranda.html
[https://perma.cc/SH25-M4YL].
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recited to a suspect during an episode of Law & Order, we assume
that justice will be done, equally and fairly, no matter the
circumstances. Whether the suspect has been arrested for a serious
felony or for a trivial violation, whether he is guilty or innocent, white
or minority, rich or poor, employed or unemployed—in all of these
cases, the criminal justice system will work swiftly and fairly to find
the truth, with minimal inconvenience and cost to the accused. In
practice, this is far from the truth: many people who have been
accused of any crime—even a victimless crime or a crime they did not
commit—suffer severe consequences that impede their livelihoods
and disrupt their lives while serving no appreciable public interest.
And those adverse consequences fall disproportionately—in some
cases entirely—on the low-income people that the criminal justice
system should be committed to protecting. Generally, those attorneys
who pursue public defense as a calling do so for this reason: they
know that even with an attorney, the odds are stacked against
indigent criminal defendants. But many are surprised at just how
stark the contrast can be. For this Symposium marking the fiftieth
anniversary of David Caplovitz’s seminal work, The Poor Pay More,2
I draw on my experiences as a public defender in the Bronx to
elucidate how criminal charges—and in particular, low-level
charges—can prove far costlier in time and dollars for indigent
defendants, and how this phenomenon can keep the poor in poverty.
This Essay imagines the paths of two individuals, each arrested for
misdemeanor drug-possession.3 It follows Joe, an indigent, thirtyyear-old black man, and Richard, a middle class, thirty-year old white
man, through identical drug possession cases and traces the ways in
which their cases—and the costs involved—diverge due to the race
and wealth differences between the two men.4 The Essay tracks the
cases through arrest, bail hearing, pendency of the case, plea
negotiations, and aftermath. I conclude by proposing five changes to
state-level criminal law, procedure, and policy, one at each stage of
the case, that can help ease the poverty tax inherent in criminal cases:
(1) eliminate policing practices that pull low-income people into the
criminal justice system; (2) encourage judges to make individualized
2. DAVID CAPLOVITZ, THE POOR PAY MORE: CONSUMER PRACTICES OF LOWINCOME FAMILIES (1967).
3. A misdemeanor is a minor offense that is punishable by no more than one
year in jail. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 10.00(4) (McKinney 2017). Non-criminal violations
are lesser offenses that are punishable by no more than fifteen days in jail. Id.
§ 10.00(2)–(3).
4. These hypotheticals are based on my observations, made primarily while
working as a public defender in the Bronx.
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bail assessments tailored to what families can afford; (3) get rid of the
requirement for all criminal defendants to appear in court on each of
their court dates; (4) create meaningful, affordable, and feasible
alternatives to incarceration that do not require defendants to pay for
their freedom; and (5) ban all but the most essential collateral
consequences of criminal convictions.
I. TWO SYSTEMS OF JUSTICE
A. Arrest
Joe’s chances of being arrested are markedly higher than
Richard’s, regardless of culpability. Joe is a person of color in the
South Bronx, in the poorest congressional district in the country.5
Richard is a white man who lives a few miles away on the Upper East
Side of Manhattan, in the wealthiest congressional district.6 Stops
and searches by the police that lead to arrests are an uncommon
occurrence on the Upper East Side and rarely target white people in
any neighborhood, but they are an everyday occurrence for people of
color in the South Bronx.7 Police on patrol in the South Bronx may
conduct a stop that leads to Joe’s arrest. In addition to increased
police patrols and stops, there are several other police practices that
are far more common in low-income neighborhoods than in wealthier
ones. First, an officer may spot discarded drugs or drug paraphernalia

5. See Bronx Cheer: Seeking Votes in America’s Poorest, Most Democratic
District, THE ECONOMIST (Apr. 14, 2016), https://www.economist.com/news/united-

states/21696938-seeking-votes-americas-poorest-most-democratic-district-bronxcheer [https://perma.cc/2KY5-H3DJ].
6. See Kelsey Warner, Where Are the Richest Voter Districts in the U.S.?, BUS.
2 CMTY. (Apr. 14, 2016), http://www.business2community.com/government-politics/
richest-voter-districts-u-s-01516219 [https://perma.cc/U5T3-9V7S].
7. In 2013, a federal judge found the New York Police Department liable for a
pattern and practice of racial profiling and unconstitutional stops in heavily policed
neighborhoods, including the Bronx. See generally Floyd v. City of New York,
959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). In another decision, following a preliminary
injunction hearing in a related stop-and-frisk case focusing solely on police stops
made in the Bronx, the court found:
[W]hile it may be difficult to say where, precisely, to draw the line between
constitutional and unconstitutional police encounters, such a line exists, and
the NYPD has systematically crossed it when making trespass stops outside
TAP buildings in the Bronx. For those of us who do not fear being stopped
as we approach or leave our own homes or those of our friends and families,
it is difficult to believe that residents of one of our boroughs live under such
a threat. In light of the evidence presented at the hearing, however, I am
compelled to conclude that this is the case.
Ligon v. City of New York, 925 F. Supp. 2d 478, 486 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
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on the ground and charge a passerby with possession of those drugs
or drug paraphernalia.8 Second, Joe might be approached by an
undercover officer posing as an addict looking for a fix.9 If Joe directs
the undercover officer to a dealer and facilitates a small drug deal, he
can be charged with felony-level drug sale, even if he never sold or
even possessed drugs.10 Joe is far more likely to be arrested than
Richard, even if Richard routinely walks around with a substantial
amount of controlled substances, and Joe never does.11
If he is arrested, Richard can call one of several attorneys he
knows. He could call his sister, who is a civil lawyer, or his college
roommate who became a prosecutor. That attorney can invoke his
rights to the police,12 thereby halting any police questioning, and can
come to the precinct to witness any lineup or other procedures,
voicing any objections to the process and generally acting as an
additional pair of eyes, warding against abuses of police authority.
Joe, on the other hand, counts no lawyers among his family or friends,
and although his brother liked the public defender he was assigned
for a minor arrest last year, he does not have her phone number on
hand. Police are therefore free to question Joe and try to get him to
make an inculpatory statement. Because he was arrested in New
York City, Joe does not receive representation until his bail hearing,
which means that he does not benefit from legal counsel while
detained by police.13 Even though he denies the charge of drug
possession, the officers manage to make him nervous enough to trip
8. As a public defender in the Bronx, I encountered a number of individuals who
were arrested and charged under similar circumstances.
9. See Joseph Goldstein, Undercover Officers Ask Addicts to Buy Drugs,
Snaring Them but Not Dealers, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/
2016/04/05/nyregion/undercover-officers-ask-addicts-to-buy-drugs-snaring-them-butnot-dealers.html?_r=0 [https://nyti.ms/2kBHn7L].
10. Id.
11. Police have been found to conduct unconstitutional stops in the Bronx in
particular. See, e.g., Joseph Goldstein, Police Stop-and-Frisk Program in Bronx Is
Ruled Unconstitutional, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 8, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/
2013/01/09/nyregion/judge-limits-nypd-stop-and-frisk-program-in-bronx.html
[https://nyti.ms/VIEa2z].
12. See People v. Rogers, 48 N.Y.2d 167, 170 (1979) (“[O]nce an attorney has
entered the proceeding, thereby signifying that the police should cease questioning, a
defendant in custody may not be further interrogated in the absence of counsel.”).
13. In New York, defendants are entitled to representation beginning at
arraignment. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 180.10(3) (McKinney 2017). However, recent
cases have shown that this right has not always been honored in practice. See HurrellHarring v. State, 15 N.Y.3d 8, 20–21 (2010) (“Recognizing the crucial importance of
arraignment and the extent to which a defendant’s basic liberty and due process
interests may then be affected, CPL 180.10 (3) expressly provides for the ‘right to the
aid of counsel at the arraignment and at every subsequent stage of the action . . . .’”).
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over his words when explaining where he was headed when the police
stopped and arrested him. The prosecutor can later use that
misstatement during a bail hearing to make Joe appear suspicious.
Joe also does not have the benefit of an attorney’s presence for any
part of identification or other pre-booking procedures. Even before
the case has begun, police have a greater opportunity to create a case
against Joe than Richard.
B.

Bail Hearing

The bail hearing, an early court appearance during which the
charges are read and the judge makes a bail determination, presents
the clearest difference between Richard’s experience and Joe’s.
Richard will almost surely walk out of court and fight his case from
the outside, while Joe may be forced to spend weeks, months, or even
years14 in jail while his case is pending. The most obvious reason for
this is that Richard’s friends and family have more cash readily
available to pay any bail that might be set. Depending on the judge,
the jurisdiction, the prosecutor, the defense lawyer, and on Richard
and Joe’s respective prior experiences with the criminal justice
system, a judge might release them on their own recognizance or
might set bail of several thousand dollars. In most other states,
defendants are not guaranteed an attorney at all during bail
proceedings, so unless they have a private lawyer or the locality
chooses to provide public defenders at that stage, they are not
represented when bail is determined.15
But let us suppose that, despite all this, bail is set equally. The
judge sets bail at “$2000 bond/$1000 cash” for both Joe and Richard,
meaning that they can bail out by paying $1000 in cash or by getting a
bond worth $2000. Richard can easily get any number of friends or
relatives to withdraw $1000 and, if they post it at the courthouse, he
can be released directly from court before being taken to Rikers
Island. At the end of his case, assuming Richard has not absconded,
the court will return about ninety percent of the posted bail. Richard
is a software engineer at a successful start-up firm. When he is
arrested, he calls his boss and says he needs to take two personal days

14. See William Glaberson, In Misdemeanor Cases, Long Waits for Elusive
N.Y.
TIMES
(Apr.
30,
2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/
05/01/nyregion/justice-denied-for-misdemeanor-cases-trials-are-elusive.html
[https://perma.cc/VML4-CT59] (studying fifty-four marijuana misdemeanor cases and
showing many cases lasted well over a year, none of which received a trial).
15. See Alexander Bunin, The Constitutional Right to Counsel at Bail Hearings,
31 CRIM. JUST. 23, 23 (2016).

Trials,
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for an emergency. No questions are asked, and his pay and
employment are not affected. Richard rents his apartment from a
private landlord, who never finds out about his arrest, and by next
year, he will own his own apartment.16
Joe has no bank account, and most of his friends and family work
off the books and don’t use banks, either. No one can afford $1000 to
pay his bail in cash. His family and friends might be able to gather
the $200 to $600 that would be needed as collateral to get a bail bond
for $2000, but it will take some time.17 It would also require one or
two people who work on the books to prove their income and agree
to pay the entire bond should Joe run off. For many in Joe’s position,
it is not easy to find someone with a regular paystub who is willing to
front the collateral and to be liable for the full amount. Even if he
does convince his brother’s girlfriend, who is a teacher, and his
cousin, who drives a taxi, to sign off on his bond, the bail bondsman
will keep thirty percent to forty percent of the collateral at the end of
the case. For a small bond, like this one, the bondsman will often
keep the entire collateral. And in many cases, bail bondsmen require
defendants who bail out with bonds to wear monitoring devices such
as ankle bracelets, and charge hundreds of dollars monthly for the use
of those devices.18 These costs can add up to far more than the bail
that was initially set—the cash payment that Richard made.
If the judge sets bail that Joe cannot afford, the prospect of
incarceration will create a strong incentive for him to accept the first
plea bargain offered by the prosecution,19 even if that offer requires
him to serve some jail time or would give him a criminal record.
Richard, fighting his case from the outside, will have time on his side
and can wait the months or years it takes to get to trial or to receive
an acceptable offer from the prosecutor. In at least one jurisdiction,

16. Because Richard, unlike Joe, is able to pay any fines or fees that are imposed
in his case, his credit score is never affected, allowing him to get a mortgage.
17. A survey conducted by the Federal Reserve in 2015 found that forty-six
percent of adults could not cover an emergency expense of $400 without selling
something or borrowing money. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS.,
REPORT ON THE ECONOMIC WELL-BEING OF U.S. HOUSEHOLDS IN 2015, at 1 (2016),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/2015-report-economic-well-being-us-households201605.pdf [https://perma.cc/5L6J-Y2WV].
18. See Eric Markowitz, Chain Gang 2.0: If You Can’t Afford This GPS Ankle
Bracelet, You Get Thrown in Jail, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Sept. 21, 2015, 7:55 AM),
http://www.ibtimes.com/chain-gang-20-if-you-cant-afford-gps-ankle-bracelet-you-getthrown-jail-2065283 [https://perma.cc/Q9MU-FVB2].
19. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE PRICE OF FREEDOM: BAIL AND PRETRIAL
DETENTION OF LOW INCOME NONFELONY DEFENDANTS IN NEW YORK CITY 2–3, 31–
34 (2010).
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Joe may choose not to bail out, even if he is able to, because it could
create the automatic presumption that he is not eligible for a public
defender.20 Joe knows that even if his family can scrape together bail
money, he certainly cannot afford the services of a private attorney.
In Joe’s case, his family could not come up with $1000 cash, but
eventually paid $400 to a bail bondsman, who explained that he had
to charge twenty percent collateral and not the usual ten percent
because it was not a big enough bond to justify his time with only a
$200 collateral. When two other bondsmen said the same, Joe’s wife
simply paid the $400, knowing she probably would not get much, if
any, of that collateral back. Luckily, the bondsman did not obligate
Joe to wear—and pay for—an ankle monitor
Joe is more likely than Richard to lose out on income even if he is
released without bail or manages to bail out. He is a dishwasher at a
restaurant, and although he has a good relationship with his
supervisor and his co-workers, the policy is to dock pay for two
unexcused absences, and to terminate employment upon the third.
According to that policy, if the arrest-to-arraignment process takes
two workdays, Joe will lose two days of wages. If it stretches into
three, however, he will be fired.21 His supervisor will be sad to see
him go, but he will also be able to replace him quickly. City and state
employees, and those who need licenses, have it even worse. New
York has over 100 licensing systems for various occupations, and an
arrest can trigger immediate suspension of that license, which can
result in job termination, even if case is later dismissed and the person
is never convicted.22 In addition to losing his job, Joe runs the risk of
losing his apartment, even if he is never convicted of anything; arrests

20. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 1355A(D) (2017).
21. See McGregor Smyth, “Collateral” No More: The Practical Imperative for
Holistic Defense in a Post-Padilla World . . . Or, How to Achieve Consistently Better
Results for Clients, 31 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 139, 163 (2011) [hereinafter
“Collateral” No More] (“[E]ven short-term detention not only creates inordinate
pressures to plead guilty but can have drastic immigration and employment
outcomes.”); McGregor Smyth, Holistic Is Not a Bad Word: A Criminal Defense
Attorney’s Guide to Using Invisible Punishments as an Advocacy Strategy, 36 U.
TOL. L. REV. 479, 481 (2005) [hereinafter Holistic Is Not a Bad Word] (“Poorer
defendants are disproportionately affected by this phenomenon, as they are more
likely to have jobs without vacation benefits, flexibility, or labor protections.”).
22. Holistic Is Not a Bad Word, supra note 21, at 496 (“When a client lives in
subsidized housing . . . is a public employee or has an employment license . . . defense
attorneys should take note. In all of these cases, the client is likely to have an
ancillary civil or administrative proceeding pending at the same time as the criminal
case.”); see also Julie Dressner & Jesse Hicks, A Marijuana Arrest, BUZZFEED NEWS
(Dec.
8,
2013),
https://www.buzzfeed.com/jdressner/a-marijuana-arrest?utm_
term=.pe0vn5A11M [https://youtu.be/MEzZSDKOVM4].
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often trigger termination proceedings in publicly funded housing.23 In
administrative hearings, standards of proof are often lower than they
are in criminal court.24
C.

Pending Case

During the case, both Joe and Richard will be obligated to make
regular court appearances approximately once every six weeks.
These court appearances might take anywhere from one to eight
hours. Unlike for civil litigants, they are not optional. When they
arrive at their respective courthouses at 9:00 a.m., as they are
instructed, Richard and Joe are confronted with a security line that
regularly extends outside and down the block, regardless of the
weather. After making their way through security, each finds the
courtroom and is told to wait. Both are surrounded by chaos:
attorneys calling out for clients, weepy parents craning their necks to
catch a glimpse of an incarcerated son or daughter, and court officers
barking commands at defendants and their families who pack the
benches in the courtroom—“take off your hat,” “stop whispering,”
“no reading allowed.”
The similarities end there, however. For Richard, court dates will
impose far less of a burden. He takes taxis to and from court to make
sure he is on time. He has a nanny for his infant son and his wife has
flexibility at her job that allows her to care for the child in a pinch.
His supervisor does not question his occasional absence or lateness.
Richard’s attorney shows up immediately, as Richard’s case is the
only court appearance she has scheduled that day. She spends half an
hour talking to him outside the courtroom, and, because the clerk can
see that Richard has a private attorney, he lets them jump the line,
putting him before everyone represented by a public defender.
During his appearance before the judge, his attorney and the
prosecutor decide on another day to return to court to continue
proceedings. Richard walks out of the courthouse and is on his way
to work by 10:15 a.m.
Joe waits in the courtroom, abiding by the no-phone, no-reading
rules. He sees one case called after another. An hour passes, and Joe
begins to worry he is in the wrong place, but he cannot use his phone
to call or text his attorney. Finally, at 10:45 a.m., he sees his attorney
rush in and call out his name. Unlike Richard’s attorney, she must
appear on ten cases in four separate courtrooms that day, and Joe’s
23. “Collateral” No More, supra note 21, at 149.
24. Id.
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courtroom is the second one she gets to in the morning. She calls his
name along with two other names, and asks Joe and her two other
clients to come talk to her outside the courtroom, where she speaks to
each of them for approximately two minutes each. She explains to
Joe that the prosecution has not yet made a plea offer in his case, nor
have they provided any discovery, so there is not much to do today
except ask the judge to set a schedule for her to file legal motions and
choose another date to return to court. She explains this, asks if he
has any questions, and signs him up on a list all within those two
minutes. Joe takes his seat again in the courtroom and listens to case
after case called before the judge. He sees no trials or hearings. He
hears one or two people plead guilty to misdemeanors or violations.
He hears the prosecutors state over and over that they are not ready
to proceed to trial, and a few defense attorneys say the same.25
Mostly he hears scheduling discussions. The majority of time before
the judge, it seems, is spent deciding on a date to return to court that
works with the attorneys’ and the judge’s schedules.
At 1:00 p.m., just as he is sure that his turn must be coming up, Joe
hears the court officer announce that the court will take its lunch
break and resume at 2:15 p.m.
Everyone seems to groan
simultaneously. As attorneys and clients file out of the courtroom,
Joe finds his lawyer and asks if he really needs to come back in the
afternoon, given that this will surely mean taking an entire day off of
work. His attorney nods in sympathy and says that if he does not
return to court, the judge will likely issue a warrant for his arrest. Joe
trudges outside, kills an hour without eating because he has no
appetite, and comes back early, only to sit on a bench and wait. The
judge returns to the courtroom at 2:40 p.m., and his case is finally
called at 3:15 p.m. The appearance lasts for ninety seconds.26 He
leaves with a slip of paper in his hand reminding him to return to
court for his next court appearance, six weeks later. The appearances
alone are enough to make him want to plead guilty. He tries his
25. The New York Times conducted a comprehensive investigation into court
delay in the Bronx in 2013. See William Glaberson, Faltering Courts, Mired in
Delays, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/14/nyregion/
justice-denied-bronx-court-system-mired-in-delays.html
[https://perma.cc/S2PPF97D] (“For years trials have been postponed every week because there were not
enough judges. But less compelling reasons are also sufficient, including prosecutors’
vacation plans and defense lawyers’ birthdays. Even excuses like a backache and a
picnic were deemed sound enough to keep the courts waiting.”).
26. For an excellent description of the grueling process of calendar days and court
delays in New York City criminal courts, particularly applied to misdemeanor cases,
see DAVID FEIGE, INDEFENSIBLE: ONE LAWYER’S JOURNEY INTO THE INFERNO OF
AMERICAN JUSTICE ch. 9 (2006).
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boss’s patience every time he asks for time off, and because he does
not know for sure when he will return to work in the afternoon, he
must take a full day off each time. He loses a day’s salary for every
appearance. He is unable to reliably pick his children up from
daycare in the afternoons when he goes to court and has to impose on
a neighbor. When he asks his attorney how much longer the case will
drag on for, she smiles apologetically and says it could be months or,
if he insists on a trial, years. Joe wonders how many more of these
court dates he can afford, or stomach.
D. Plea Negotiations
Both Richard’s and Joe’s cases are set for trial after two court
appearances, during which the defense files an omnibus motion
requesting pretrial hearings, the prosecution opposes them, and the
judge grants the defense’s motion. Even when the case is scheduled
for trial, however, neither defense has received any discovery from
the prosecutor, who is not obligated to provide the bulk of discovery
until right before trial.
Richard and Joe both face the same misdemeanor drug possession
charge, which carries a maximum sentence of one year of
incarceration.27 Although Richard has not received discovery from
the prosecution, his private attorney is able to investigate the case
fully, so that he is not entirely in the dark. The court dates are more
manageable for him, and he does not feel pressured or desperate to
put the case behind him. The collateral consequences of a conviction
for a low-level drug offense do not threaten to upend his life: he does
not live in public housing, he does not have a government job, and he
does not receive government benefits. Unlike many low-income New
Yorkers, Richard relies on the private sector; he is far less entangled
with government programs than someone like Joe, and therefore has
far less to fear when facing criminal conviction.
Not knowing the strength of the evidence against him, and knowing
that if he goes to trial and is convicted, he faces up to a year in jail
plus all of the collateral consequences,28 Joe gets nervous. His
attorney, a dedicated and caring public defender, cannot fully
investigate his case because her few investigators are occupied with
more serious felony cases. The regular court dates begin to wear on
him. His boss is losing his patience with his absences. Joe begins to

27. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 220.03 (McKinney 2017).
28. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 10.00(4) (McKinney 2017); infra notes 33–36 and
accompanying text.
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consider taking a plea bargain, any plea deal that would not send him
to jail. He even begins to consider the idea of taking a deal that
would involve a short stint in jail, or one that would permanently give
him a criminal record.
Assuming that Joe and Richard meet certain eligibility
requirements, such as a lack of a criminal record, both might be
eligible for a diversion program, which would allow for their charges
to be dropped or reduced upon completion of a treatment program.
However, these programs are often costly in time and dollars, and
indigent defendants often have a harder time completing the
programs successfully for reasons entirely out of their control.29 In
my practice, several of my clients who entered court-mandated
inpatient programs told me that the conditions they encountered were
only slightly better than those at Rikers Island. I saw clients, fully
engaged in court-mandated treatment programs, struggle or fail for
reasons having nothing to do with their willingness to comply. One
had to borrow from several family members, friends, and his
girlfriend to afford the twenty-five dollars per treatment session that
was charged. Another, months into an inpatient drug treatment
program during which he had remained completely sober, requested
permission to leave for the day to see his children. After visiting with
them, he stopped in at the courthouse to meet with his case manager
because he wanted extra support and guidance. Because he made the
extra stop at the courthouse and did not return to the program
directly after seeing his children, the program took away his
privileges, mandated additional time, and nearly ejected him
altogether.
When defendants fail to complete their programs successfully, they
face a previously negotiated jail alternative, which is often
significantly more time than would have been offered in the first
place. These alternatives are put in place to create a strong incentive
to comply, but often end up punishing those who are poor,
disorganized, or suffer from addiction or mental health issues. One
client of mine, charged with felony drug sale for facilitating a small
drug hand-off with an undercover officer, turned down a nine-month
jail offer and instead embarked on a program. When he relapsed, he
failed the program and was sentenced to the jail alternative, which, in
his case, was three and a half years in an upstate prison. After he was
released, he relapsed again.
29. See Shaila Dewan & Andrew W. Lehren, After a Crime, the Price of a Second
Chance, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 12, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/12/us/crimecriminal-justice-reform-diversion.html [https://nyti.ms/2hEi1kG].
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If Richard does not want a formal diversion program, he might ask
the prosecutor for the chance to plead to a lesser charge if he
completes a drug treatment program on his own. Richard, who has
excellent medical coverage, and, if he really needed to, could afford
to pay out-of-pocket, has more options than Joe.30 Richard may be
able to take a medical leave from his job to complete it if it is an
inpatient program, or request a modified work schedule if it is an
outpatient program. He might also find a program that meets on
nights or weekends. Joe, covered only by Medicaid, would have far
fewer options and might have to choose between his job and the
program, as many are held during the week when he has work. Even
if Joe finds a Medicaid-covered program that meets outside of regular
work hours, his schedule is subject to change with little notice, and
chances are high that he would end up having to either miss work or
fail out of the program.31
The prosecutor may give Richard and Joe the option to pay a fine
instead of completing a drug program. Of course, this option will be
more readily available to Richard than to Joe. Unable to afford a
drug program or pay a fine, Joe is more likely to accept a jail
sentence. Ironically, the jail time, like the drug program, may
ultimately cost Joe his job and end up being more expensive than it
would have been for Richard.
E.

Aftermath

Let us assume that Joe and Richard both resolve their cases via
plea bargain, as the overwhelming majority of defendants do.32 In
addition to a costlier sentence, Joe stands a good chance of having to
accept a higher criminal charge than Richard. He may have to plead
guilty to a misdemeanor—resulting in a criminal conviction—instead
of a non-criminal violation, which is more likely for Richard. The
reasons for this are similar to those above: Joe is more likely to feel
pressure to take a plea early because he is incarcerated, or, if he is not
incarcerated, because repeated court appearances are expensive and
30. Although many addiction treatment programs accept insurance, offer some
financial aid, or have financing options, many remain out of reach for the uninsured
or for those on Medicaid. See Cost of Drug and Alcohol Rehab: Understanding the
Cost of Rehab, ADDICTION CENT., https://www.addictioncenter.com/rehab-questions/
cost-of-drug-and-alcohol-treatment [https://perma.cc/3D3V-T4FP].
31. See LONNIE GOLDEN, ECON. POLICY INST., BRIEFING PAPER NO. 394:
IRREGULAR WORK SCHEDULING AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (2015), http://www.epi.org/
files/pdf/82524.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z5JZ-G2PB].
32. See Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 143 (2012) (noting that ninety-four percent
of state defendants and ninety-seven percent of federal defendants plead guilty).
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stressful for him. He therefore might not have the luxury to wait for
an acceptable offer, which often comes months or years after a case is
opened. Richard can afford to wait.
The higher charge would mean more collateral consequences for
Joe. The quantity and scope of collateral consequences attached to
criminal convictions have proliferated in recent years. This is due in
part to new rules that bar people with certain convictions—often lowlevel convictions—from certain benefits such as housing,
employment, student loans, child custody, and immigration status.33
It also owes to the increased ease with which arrest and conviction
records can be obtained by private and government parties.34
According to Professor Michael Pinard, collateral consequences
“burden individuals long past the expiration of their sentences
and . . . individually and collectively, frustrate their ability to move
past their criminal records.”35
Joe’s criminal record might make it impossible for him to stay in
his apartment, which he rents through the New York City Housing
Authority. In New York, misdemeanor convictions exclude a person
from public housing for either three or four years, depending on the
severity of the misdemeanor.36 A conviction might make it difficult
for him to keep his job or to find a new one; if he is not a citizen, it
could make him deportable or keep him from naturalizing. In New
York and most other jurisdictions, higher charges come with higher
fines and fees, which, if Joe cannot afford them, will count against his
credit. Richard, facing lower fines and fees, can pay them easily,
preserving his credit score.
II. CLOSING THE GAP: PROPOSALS
A. Arrest: Stop Creating Criminals
One concrete change we can implement to make Joe’s story more
closely resemble Richard’s would be to eliminate policing policies
that ensnare low-income people who pose little or no risk to society.

33. See Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice and Mass Misdemeanors,
66 STAN. L. REV. 611, 621 (2014).
34. See id.
35. Michael Pinard, Reflections and Perspectives on Reentry and Collateral
Consequences, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1213, 1214 (2010).
36. This period begins when the individual has completed their sentence,
assuming he or she has no further convictions or pending charges. See JOHN BAE ET
AL., VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, COMING HOME: AN EVALUATION OF THE NEW YORK
CITY HOUSE AUTHORITY’S FAMILY REENTRY PILOT PROGRAM 9 (2016).
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This includes hot spot and broken windows policing, which focus
police efforts on poor neighborhoods and minor offenses.37 Broken
windows theory,38 which holds that preventing quality-of-life offenses
such as drinking in public, turnstile jumping, and vandalism can help
maintain order and prevent more serious crime, was implemented as
a policing strategy in New York City in the 1990s by police
commissioner William Bratton and mayor Rudolph Giuliani.39
Misdemeanor and violation arrests increased sharply.40 According to
Human Rights Watch, in 1989, half of arrests in New York City were
for felonies.41 Twenty years later, almost three-quarters, 72%, were
for misdemeanors.42 Most of those arrested for misdemeanors,
82.4%, were black or Hispanic.43 In Manhattan during 2016 alone,
police arrested nearly 25,000 people for fare evasion—usually,
jumping the turnstile in the subway—a policy that has recently come
under scrutiny by prosecutors for its disproportionate impact on lowincome people.44
37. See K. Babe Howell, Broken Lives from Broken Windows: The Hidden Costs
of Aggressive Order-Maintenance Policing, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 271,

292 (2009) (“Many of [the] costs are externalized, born by individual arrestees, their
families, their communities, and the larger community of taxpayers to the extent that
arrests and criminal records lead to further arrests, incarceration, or
un(der)employment.”); Jenny Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter: Defining
Effective Advocacy in the Lower Criminal Courts, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 277, 297–
300 (2011) (discussing the significant collateral consequences of minor misdemeanor
convictions); see also Alexandra Natapoff, Aggregation and Urban Misdemeanors,
40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1043, 1062–66 (2013); Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors,
85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1331–37 (2012).
38. See George L. Kelling & James Q. Wilson, Broken Windows: The Police and
Neighborhood Safety, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 1982), https://www.theatlantic.com/
magazine/archive/1982/03/broken-windows/304465 [https://perma.cc/NHE5-URLW].
39. See Reuven Fenton, Bill Bratton Still Believes in ‘Broken Windows’ Policing,
N.Y. POST (June 24, 2016, 1:16 AM), http://nypost.com/2016/06/24/bill-bratton-sillbelieves-in-broken-windows-policing [https://perma.cc/8HJF-M98M]; William Wan,
Does New York City’s ‘Broken Windows’ Policing Work?: New Report Says No,
WASH. POST (June 22, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/
wp/2016/06/22/does-nypds-broken-windows-policing-work-new-report-says-no
[https://perma.cc/FF8K-MSUV].
40. For an analysis of misdemeanor arrests in New York City, see KohlerHausmann, supra note 33, at 614.
41. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 19, at 10.
42. Id.
43. Id. In the Bronx in 2016, only thirty-one percent of adult arrests were for
felonies. See N.Y. State Div. of Criminal Justice Servs., Adult Arrests: 2007–2016,
Bronx (Feb. 17, 2017), http://www.criminaljustice.ny.gov/crimnet/ojsa/arrests/
Bronx.pdf [https://perma.cc/W7M9-8HT3].
44. James C. McKinley Jr., For Manhattan Fare Beaters, One-Way Ticket to
Court May Be Over, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/06/30/nyregion/subway-fare-beating-new-york.html [https://nyti.ms/2urQNnM].
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We can also eliminate most entrapment-like arrest policies, which
we might call “created crime.” Created crimes are those offenses that
never would have occurred if not for police involvement. They
include sting operations, wherein undercover officers pose as
prostitutes or as patrons and try to get civilians to agree to a sexual
transaction before making an arrest, and “buy and bust” drug
operations, wherein undercover officers posing as drug users target
individuals who appear to them to be users—very often, poor people
of color—and ask them to facilitate a small drug sale.45 The target
then finds a street-level dealer and facilitates a deal between the
undercover and the dealer, after which he or she is promptly arrested
for drug sale (as opposed to mere possession).46 Much of the time,
only the facilitator is arrested, not the dealer.47 These sting
operations target individuals in low-income neighborhoods and tend
to ensnare some of society’s most vulnerable members—in these
cases, drug users and sex workers. These people are often indigent
addicts whose criminal behaviors harm them more than others.
Targeting people to catch them in acts that otherwise would never
have taken place is tremendously costly for police departments, and
therefore taxpayers, requiring many officers’ labor, as compared to
patrol arrests, which usually require only one or two officers.48
Further, they create the very real possibility of enticing people into
addictive and illegal behaviors that they may have worked hard to
avoid.49
In my experience as a public defender, I have seen more than one
individual relapse after long periods of sobriety because of a “buy and
bust” sting operation. One client, an immigrant in his mid-fifties,
described the drug set-up upon meeting me through the bars of
central booking soon after his arrest. He then put his head in his

45. See Goldstein, supra note 9.
46. Id.
47. Id. (“The big underlying question is why a nine-person buy-and-bust team did
not follow [the defendant] to the dealer where he got [the drugs] from . . . . Everyone
[on the jury] was scratching their heads, wondering what the heck is wrong with our
system.”).
48. Id. (“One juror said that what troubled the jury the most was that a nineperson narcotics squad—which included two undercover officers, several
investigators and supporting officers—would bring a case against a single addict.”).
49. A defendant in a Manhattan buy-and-bust case told a reporter:
For him to put the money in my hands, as an addict, let me tell you what
happens . . . . I like to think I could resist it, but I’m way beyond that. My
experience has shown me that 1,000 times out of 1,000 times, I will be
defeated.

Id.
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hands and said, “Now I’m in jail, and I’m relapsed. Now what?”
Another client, a middle-aged woman, told me that her husband of
fifteen years had recently left her, so she had been in a particularly
vulnerable mindset, financially and emotionally, when an undercover
officer pulled up in his car, lowered his window, and solicited sex
from her in exchange for money. Police departments, in short, should
eliminate policies that disproportionately pull indigent and vulnerable
people into the criminal justice system, especially those who pose
little or no danger to society.
B.

Bail Hearing: Stop Incarcerating Poverty

Arraignments, or bail hearings, need not cost indigent defendants
more than wealthy ones.
First, everyone should have legal
representation at a hearing when bail is decided. People who are
represented by an attorney are two and a half times more likely to be
released without bail being set than those without counsel.50 Further,
defendants representing themselves might unknowingly waive certain
rights or foreclose certain defenses, making their cases less successful
later on. Equally important, judges must stop allowing people to sit
in jail throughout their cases simply because they cannot afford to pay
bail. An analysis of income data and bail data by the Prison Policy
Initiative revealed that the median bail bond amount in the United
States equals eight months of income for the typical detained
defendant.51 Seventy percent of people in jail have been convicted of
no crime; they are simply waiting for pending cases, most of which
involve non-violent accusations, to be resolved.52
If a person is held in jail during the pendency of the case, her
chances of pleading guilty increase significantly, as do her non-bail
court fees.53 A study conducted over the course of a decade in New
50. See Douglas L. Colbert et al., Do Attorneys Really Matter?: The Empirical
and Legal Case for the Right of Counsel at Bail, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1719, 1720

(2001) (summarizing an eighteen-month study in Baltimore, Maryland).
51. See BERNADETTE RABUY & DANIEL KOPF, PRISON POLICY INITIATIVE,
DETAINING THE POOR: HOW MONEY BAIL PERPETUATES AN ENDLESS CYCLE OF
POVERTY AND JAIL TIME 3 (2016), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/
incomejails.html [https://perma.cc/9DYT-SW2C].
52. See PETER WAGNER & BERNADETTE RABUY, PRISON POLICY INITIATIVE,
MASS INCARCERATION: THE WHOLE PIE 2017
(Mar.
14,
2017),
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2017.html [https://perma.cc/6XJ5-MRVR].
53. One Philadelphia study found that “pretrial detention leads to a 13% increase
in the likelihood of being convicted, an effect largely explained by an increase in
guilty pleas among defendants who otherwise would have been acquitted or had their
charges dropped.” See Megan Stevenson, Distortion of Justice: How the Inability to
Pay Bail Affects Case Outcomes 17–18 (Jan. 12, 2017) (unpublished manuscript),
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York City concluded that pretrial detainees were more likely to be
convicted, to be sentenced to incarceration, and to receive longer
sentences than those who were not detained pretrial.54 Specifically,
this study found that among defendants accused of misdemeanors,
those who were released after a bail hearing were convicted fifty
percent of the time, those who were incarcerated on bail for part of
the pendency of their cases were convicted sixty percent to seventy
percent of the time, and those who were detained for the entire
pendency of the case were convicted ninety percent of the time.55
We need individualized bail assessments based on actual
information about what defendants can afford, so that bail can serve
its intended purpose: to create a meaningful incentive for people to
return to court during their cases. After all, the purpose of bail is to
ensure that people will comply with court obligations until the case is
finished, while remaining in the community; it is not to incarcerate
low-income people on the basis of an as-yet unproven accusation.56
For Joe, putting up $200 is a stronger incentive to return to each court
date than a bail of $2000 would be to Richard. Judges should conduct
an inquiry and determine, based on a person’s employment and their
family’s resources, what an appropriate sum might be to make sure he
returns to court, if any bail is needed at all. In the vast majority of
cases, people return to court because they are required to do so, and
they do not need any external incentive.57 Releasing people without

http://www.econ.pitt.edu/sites/default/files/Stevenson.jmp2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/
V9LN-ESP3]. The study also found that “[p]retrial detention also leads to a 41%
increase in the amount of non-bail court fees owed and a 42% increase in the length
of the incarceration sentence.” Id. at 1. Another controlled study, conducted in
Kentucky, reached similar conclusions. See CHRISTOPHER T. LOWENKAMP ET AL.,
ARNOLD FOUND., INVESTIGATING THE IMPACT OF PRETRIAL DETENTION ON
SENTENCING OUTCOMES (2013), http://www.arnoldfoundation.org/wp-content/
uploads/2014/02/LJAF_Report_state-sentencing_FNL.pdf [https://perma.cc/W82K658V].
54. See MARY T. PHILLIPS, N.Y.C. CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCY, INC., DECADE OF
BAIL RESEARCH IN NEW YORK CITY 115, 127 (2012), http://www.nycja.org/library.php
(follow “Download” hyperlink beside “A Decade of Bail Research in New York
City”) [https://perma.cc/R2MM-X4MW].
55. Id. at 116.
56. See How Courts Work: Steps in a Trial, A.B.A DIV. FOR PUB. EDUC.,
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_education/resources/law_related_educati
on_network/how_courts_work/bail.html [https://perma.cc/4XRQ-RWDC] (“Bail is
the amount of money defendants must post to be released from custody until their
trial. Bail is not a fine. It is not supposed to be used as punishment. The purpose of
bail is simply to ensure that defendants will appear for trial and all pretrial hearings
for which they must be present.”).
57. In New York City in 2011, among defendants who were released either on
their own recognizance or by posting bail, eighty-six percent appeared at every court
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bail, or setting affordable bail to serve its original purpose, would
eliminate the need for low-income people to be removed from their
lives, spend their cases in custody, feel tremendous pressure to plead
guilty, or lose vast sums of money to bail bondsmen.
Some jurisdictions, notably New Jersey,58 Maryland,59 Chicago,60
and New Mexico61 have implemented wholesale reforms to their bail
system, some of them eliminating cash bail altogether. New Jersey
has replaced monetary bail with a risk assessment system, whereby
defendants are assessed for likelihood of flight and new criminal
activity, not ability to pay.62 Politicians63 and judges64 have, in many
cases, helped to spearhead these new measures. Indeed, it seems that
this idea is moving from the fringes to the mainstream. One marker
of just how lucrative it is for bail bondsmen to extract money from
those who cannot afford their bail is how fiercely the bail bonds
industry is fighting these efforts with lawsuits and political pressure.65

date. See N.Y.C. OFFICE OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE COORDINATOR, CRIMINAL
JUSTICE INDICATOR REPORT 3 (2013), http://www.nyc.gov/html/om/pdf/2013/
criminal_justice_indicator_report_summer_2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/C56Z-PRC9].
58. See generally Memorandum from Christopher S. Porrino, N.J. Att’y Gen., to
Dir., Div. of Crim. Justice (May 24, 2017), http://nj.gov/oag/newsreleases17/RevisedAG-Directive-2016-6_Introductory-Memo.pdf [https://perma.cc/9ADV-GPM8].
59. See Michael Dresser, Maryland Senate Passes Bill to Pare Back Court’s Bail
Rule, BALT. SUN (Mar. 22, 2017, 3:16 PM), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/
maryland/politics/bs-md-bail-reform-senate-20170322-story.html
[https://perma.cc/
PY5S-5LMK].
60. See Andy Grimm, Latest Move in Bail Reform: Chief Judge Replaces All
Bond Court Judges, CHI. SUN-TIMES (Sept. 15, 2017, 5:42 PM),
http://chicago.suntimes.com/chicago-politics/latest-move-in-bail-reform-chief-judgereplaces-all-bond-court-judges [https://perma.cc/Z4JP-F5BS].
61. See Associated Press, NM Voters Pass Constitutional Amendment on Bail
Reform, KOB4 (Nov. 8, 2016, 11:29 PM), http://www.kob.com/new-mexico-news/nmvoters-pass-constitutional-amendment-on-bail-reform-crime-prison-sentencing/
4313409/ [https://perma.cc/CPZ2-RD7C].
62. See Porinno, supra note 58, at 10.
63. See Casey Tolan, Kamala Harris, Rand Paul Introduce Bail Reform Bill,
MERCURY NEWS (July 20, 2017, 4:21 PM), http://www.mercurynews.com/2017/07/20/
kamala-harris-bail-reform-rand-paul-bill-congress [https://perma.cc/DE2Y-SV8U].
64. See James C. McKinley, Jr., State’s Chief Judge, Citing ‘Injustice,’ Lays Out
Plans to Alter Bail System, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 1, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/
10/02/nyregion/jonathan-lippman-bail-incarceration-new-york-state-chief-judge.html
[https://nyti.ms/2klsFy2].
65. New Jersey Governor Chris Christie has commented, “[t]he bail bonds
community has made a fortune over the years predominantly on the backs of poor
people in New Jersey.” Sergio Bichao, ‘Freezing Crook’ Arrested Day After
Release–But Christie Defends Bail Reform, N.J.101.5 (Feb. 13, 2017, 8:31 PM),
http://nj1015.com/freezing-crook-arrested-day-after-release-cops-say-but-christiedefends-bail-reform [https://perma.cc/9ELE-2Z5G]; see also Alan Feuer, New Jersey
Is Front Line in a National Battle Over Bail, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 21, 2017),
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C.

Pending Case: Stop Dragging Criminal Defendants to Court

One clear change we can make to create more equity during the
pendency of criminal cases is to stop requiring defendants to be
present for each court appearance. Civil litigants generally are not
required to be present and it is unclear why court appearances should
be any more necessary for criminal litigants.66 Judges might require
appearances on certain court dates, such as those on which a plea is
anticipated or a case is set for trial, but there is no reason for
defendants to be present for other appearances, such as when
decisions are made on legal motions filed by attorneys.67 For lowincome clients whose lives and schedules are at times more chaotic
and less predictable than those of middle- or upper-class defendants,
getting to court can be challenging through no fault of their own.68 A
judge once refused to believe that my client, an elderly woman who
had recently suffered a heart attack, was late to court because the
elevator in her public housing complex was broken and she could not
walk down the twelve flights of stairs. The judge issued a warrant for
my client’s arrest. Once we provided proof that the elevator was
indeed broken, the judge vacated and expunged the warrant. It can
be difficult for judges and prosecutors, who are generally not as lowincome as the indigent defendants they see every day, to understand
the challenges that are inherent in daily life for them. The
consequences of those misunderstandings can be disastrous for
defendants. Sparing defendants the burden of missing a day of work

https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/21/nyregion/new-jersey-bail-reform-lawsuits.html
[https://nyti.ms/2viV4tL]; Victoria Prieskop, Bail Bondsmen Say New Mexico
Supreme Court Ruined Them, COURTHOUSE NEWS SERV. (July 31, 2017),
https://www.courthousenews.com/bail-bondsmen-say-new-mexico-supreme-courtruined [https://perma.cc/58U6-7HGW]; Ryan J. Reilly, Dog The Bounty Hunter and
a Top Conservative Lawyer are Trying to Save the Bail Industry, HUFFINGTON POST
(Feb. 23, 2017, 7:37 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/bail-industryunconstitutional_us_58adf025e4b05ca474a04011 [https://perma.cc/8SC9-R3UW].
66. See David Feige, Opinion, Waiting and Waiting . . . for Justice, N.Y. TIMES
(May 1, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/02/opinion/waiting-and-waiting-forjustice.html [https://nyti.ms/YfjQqV] (arguing for criminal defendants to be excused
from most routine court dates).
67. Common legal motions in misdemeanor criminal cases in New York include
motions for a judge to dismiss a case, to exclude or admit certain evidence, or to
order pre-trial evidentiary hearings.
68. The frustration of navigating a low-level state criminal charge has been well
documented. See generally, e.g., MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE
PUNISHMENT (1992) (studying case processing in Connecticut courts and concluding
that the real costs to defendants in low-level cases are not the sentences imposed but
rather the costs incurred by being processed through the system, such as lost wages
and bail bond commissions).
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or finding childcare for each and every court date over a period of
months or years would allow them to fight their cases instead of
feeling coerced into accepting a plea bargain.
D. Plea Negotiations: Create Alternatives to Incarceration for
Everyone
As has been well documented, our criminal justice system is no
longer a trial system; it is primarily a plea system. Approximately
ninety-five percent of criminal cases end in plea bargains and that is
especially true for low-level state charges such as the ones considered
above.69 The options available to defendants when considering a plea
bargain are therefore of paramount importance. Defendants often
accept whatever plea bargains are offered to them—either because
they have accepted responsibility for the offense or because they
cannot afford for the case to continue any longer. Those in the latter
category may be forced to accept an incarceratory sentence when
meaningful alternatives to incarceration, such as rehabilitation
programs or the payment of fines, are unavailable to them. If we
want to create a more equal system, one where the prisons and jails
are not filled disproportionately with low-income people, we must
create meaningful alternatives to incarceration and make them
accessible to all. This means programs that are fully funded, have
flexible hours, and do not require insurance. For every option that
allows defendants to pay to resolve their cases, instead of suffering
through incarceration, we should require that a free, flexible option
be offered as well.70
E.

Aftermath: Ban Collateral Consequences

Finally, the vast majority of collateral consequences should be
banned. Collateral consequences affect the poor disproportionately
because they limit access in particular to government programs for
low-income people, the very people for whom many of these
programs were created and the people who rely on them most to live,
work, study, and put food on the table. These include student loans,

69. See Jed S. Rakoff, Why Innocent People Plead Guilty, N.Y. REV. BOOKS
(Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/11/20/why-innocent-peopleplead-guilty [https://perma.cc/EWT7-QZK9].
70. It should be noted that those charged in New York City are relatively more
fortunate than those in other jurisdictions, as funded alternative-to-incarceration
programs are available in all of the boroughs, although they are not available to every
criminal defendant in every case. See, e.g., Operating Programs, CTR. FOR COURT
INNOVATION, http://www.courtinnovation.org/projects [https://perma.cc/3V43-PV6S].
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public housing, public-sector jobs, and welfare.71 The Supreme Court
has held that public housing agencies can evict tenants for drugrelated activity of non-tenant relatives or guests, regardless of
whether the tenants knew, or should have known, about that
activity.72 This means that a low-income family of four, living lawfully
in public housing, can be made homeless because, unbeknownst to
them, a cousin comes to visit, carrying two Percocet pills in his pocket
that were not prescribed to him. Of course, for those living in nonsubsidized housing, there is no such risk.
Most collateral consequences have no relation to the offenses they
accompany. A conviction for marijuana possession in New York, for
example, can disqualify a person from public housing for several years
and can make a non-citizen deportable.73 Those consequences that
do seem tailored to the conviction, such as those for sex offenses,
have been widely criticized by those on the left and the right for being
tremendously restrictive, unduly harsh, and ineffective at preventing
future harm.74
CONCLUSION
For both Richard and Joe, getting arrested and facing criminal
charges was painful, degrading, and scary. But the footprint it left on
Richard’s life was smaller and more contained. The night he was
arrested was one of the worst nights of his life; he tried to get some
71. See Eli Hager, Six States Where Felons Can’t Get Food Stamps, MARSHALL
PROJECT (Feb. 4, 2016, 7:15 AM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2016/02/04/sixstates-where-felons-can-t-get-food-stamps [https://perma.cc/GY4M-U7W9].
72. See Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 136 (2002).
73. See BAE ET AL., supra note 36, at 9.
74. A DOJ-funded study conducted in New Jersey compared sex offense trends
during the ten years before and after the implementation of Megan’s Law, both a
federal law and an informal name for state laws, requiring law enforcement to make
information about registered sex offenders available to the public. See KRISTEN
ZGOBA ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MEGAN’S LAW: ASSESSING THE PRACTICAL
AND MONETARY EFFICACY 2 (2008), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/
225370.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZVT2-NP2K] (“Megan’s Law has no effect on
community tenure (i.e., time to first re-arrest) . . . no demonstrable effect in reducing
sexual re-offenses . . . no effect on the type of sexual re-offense or first time sexual
offense[, and] no effect on reducing the number of victims involved in sexual
offenses.”); see also, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, NO EASY ANSWERS: SEX OFFENDER
LAWS IN THE U.S. 3 (2007), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/
us0907webwcover.pdf
[https://perma.cc/H3QF-J4DD]
(“The
evidence
is
overwhelming . . . that these laws cause great harm to the people subject to them. On
the other hand, proponents of these laws are not able to point to convincing evidence
of public safety gains from them.”); Eli Lehrer, Rethinking Sex Offender Registries,
26 NAT’L AFF. 52, 54 (2016) (“Current registries are too inclusive, are overly
restrictive, and end up hurting some of those they are intended to help.”).
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sleep on the metal benches in central bookings, he declined a cheese
sandwich and carton of milk, opting for hunger, and waited to see his
attorney in court. With a clean record, a private attorney, a steady
job, and relatives in the courtroom to support him, Richard was
quickly released on his own recognizance—that is, without any bail
being set. Over the following eight months, he appeared on his case
six times. He did not mind these appearances, as they only took a
couple of hours and he never lost out on wages or annoyed his boss or
co-workers by attending. Before each appearance, his attorney and
her investigator worked to gather evidence, research the relevant law,
and negotiate with the prosecutor. Initially, the prosecution offered
to reduce the criminal misdemeanor charge to a non-criminal
violation if Richard would complete a brief outpatient drug program
of his choice. He was willing to do a treatment program, and could
afford to, but he preferred a less onerous sentence. He asked his
attorney to keep pushing for a non-criminal violation without a
treatment program. Eventually, upon presenting some of her
investigator’s findings to the prosecutor, his attorney prevailed.
Richard pled guilty to a non-criminal violation of disorderly
conduct,75 paid $120 in court surcharges,76 and left. His job, his
housing, and his life remained intact. A source of embarrassment at
first, the arrest later became a story he told at parties.
For Joe, the costs were higher. The arrest and arraignment were
painful and degrading, especially because he did not have access to an
attorney until he reached court. With no one to advocate for him, Joe
made an ill-advised statement to the police. Joe’s wife wanted to
come support him at his arraignment, but she was working the night
shift when he went before the judge, and she did not have the
flexibility to leave. Without any family in the courtroom to vouch for
him, and after the prosecutor used his statement to the police against
him, Joe was already in a worse position than Richard, even before
the judge set bail. Cash bail allowed Richard to buy his freedom
quickly, but for Joe, because his family had less money on hand, bail
was costlier. Joe was taken to Rikers Island, during which time his
wife paid over $200 to cover childcare so that she could go to work. It
took his wife four days to collect enough money for collateral, get a
bond, and wait for the bail bondsman to bail him out; at that point,
Joe was released. Luckily, Joe was a valued employee, and his boss
let him return to work after missing four days without pre-approval.

75. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.20 (McKinney 2017).
76. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 300.10 (McKinney 2017).
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Joe appeared on his case three times, and each time he lost a day of
wages. Without access to the evidence against him, knowing that he
faced up to a year of incarceration, with his boss’s patience wearing
thinner with each day of work he missed, and with no end to the case
in sight, Joe decided to take a plea. He knew that a drug treatment
program was out of the question for him, given the expense and his
variable schedule, so he decided to take the only other offer available
to him: pleading guilty to the top charge, criminal possession of a
controlled substance, a Class A misdemeanor, and a sentence of time
served.77
Unlike the disorderly conduct charge that Richard
accepted, the misdemeanor would give him a permanent criminal
record, would put his public housing in jeopardy for years, and would
come with higher surcharges—which, if he failed to pay, would count
against his credit—but he knew he could not hold out any longer for a
better offer or for trial. Making the case end was the only way to
keep his job and his housing intact for the time being. As for what
would happen in the future, he had to cross his fingers and wait.
In our current criminal justice system, Joe pays more. He pays
more in higher odds of being arrested; in his likelihood of being
incarcerated throughout his case for inability to pay bail; in costs
owed to bail bondsmen, childcare providers, and lost wages; in life
disruptions such as interference with employment and housing; in
time spent waiting in court for each scheduled court appearance; in
constrained options for resolving the case; and, when alternative
resolutions fall through, in having a criminal conviction for the rest of
his life. If New York implemented the above proposed solutions, Joe
would not face a higher likelihood of being arrested simply for living
in the Bronx; he would not face the possibility of being held on bail
without being convicted of any crime; he would not have to lose a day
of wages, and possibly his job, each time his case was scheduled in
court; he would have an equal opportunity to participate in programs
that provide alternatives to incarceration; and he would not risk
losing his job, his home, and his other benefits simply because he was
charged with a crime. In short, the process of misdemeanor criminal
justice would be less coercive for Joe, leaving him freer to avail
himself of his constitutional rights, including his right to a trial and his
right to remain silent. Joe would still have a harder time finding
decent jobs and housing, and a dollar to Joe would still be worth
much more than a dollar to Richard. Still, at the very least, our

77. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 220.03 (McKinney 2017).
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criminal justice system would stop charging poor people more simply
for the crime of being poor.

